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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Wally Kay Schultz appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, and from its order denying his 
motion for reconsideration. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In 2006, Schultz pied guilty to possession of methamphetamine. (R., 
pp.118-124.) The district court imposed a fixed five-year sentence, to run 
concurrently with a sentence in another case. (Id.) Schultz filed no direct 
appeal. (See R., p.195.) 
In 2011, the Idaho State Police conducted an administrative investigation 
of several employees of the Idaho State Police Forensic Services. (R., pp.9-10; 
Petitioner's Exhibit B.1) The ensuing report alleged that Forensics Lab Manager 
Skyler Anderson and others "maintained an ongoing unauthorized quantity of 
controlled narcotics for display purposes, outside the practices of the Forensics 
Quality Manual and without proper documentation tracking and auditing," as far 
back as 2003. (R., pp.9-10; Petitioner's Exhibit B.) The display drugs were 
used for tours of the facility. (Petitioner's Exhibit B, "Notice of Contemplated 
Disciplinary Action," p.2.) Anderson was the forensic scientist who examined, 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court granted Schultz' motion to augment the record with 
Petitioner's Exhibits A and B, which were both introduced into evidence in the 
course of his post-conviction proceedings. (3/7/13 Order.) 
1 
and identified as methamphetamine, the substances associated with Schultz' 
possession of controlled substances charge and conviction. (R., pp.56-57.) The 
State Appellate Public Defender, who previously represented Schultz in other 
cases, informed Schultz of the Idaho State Police's disclosure. (R., p.9.) 
In August 2011, Schultz filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, 
asserting various claims based on the Idaho State Police disclosure. (R., pp.1-
19.) The district court appointed counsel to represent Schultz on the petition. 
(R., p.30.) Through appointed counsel, Schultz filed an amended post-conviction 
petition, alleging that Anderson's failure to disclose his lab misconduct prior to 
Schultz' guilty plea constituted a Brady2 violation, and that the state violated his 
Sixth Amendment confrontation rights by preventing him from cross-examining 
Anderson. (R., pp.94-98.) Schultz also filed a "Motion for an Order Determining 
That This Matter Proceed as a Class Action." (R., pp.158-160.) 
The state moved for summary dismissal of Schultz' amended petition. (R., 
pp.161-165, 177-179.) In support of the motion, the state submitted a sworn 
affidavit of Idaho State Police Forensic Services Quality Manager Matthew 
Garnette, who asserted that Anderson's lab misconduct involved no forensic 
testing, and that the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors-Laboratory 
Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB) was notified of the misconduct and was 
satisfied with the actions taken by the Idaho State Police to resolve the issue. 
(R., pp.181-183.) 
2 Brady v. Maryland, 837 U.S. 83 (1963). 
2 
The district court summarily dismissed Schultz' petition, and denied his 
motion for the matter to proceed as a Class Action. (R., pp.194-204.) The court 
then denied Schultz' subsequent motion for reconsideration. (R., pp.217-224.) 
Schultz timely appealed. (R., pp.225-227.) 
3 
ISSUE 
Schultz states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether or not the District Court erred in dismissing Schultz' 
Post Conviction Petition. 
2. Whether or not the District Court erred in denying Schultz' 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
(Appellant's brief, p.8.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Schultz failed to show that the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction petition? 
2. Has Schultz failed to show that the district court manifestly abused its 




Schultz Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
Schultz contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
post-conviction petition. (See generally Appellant's brief.) Specifically, Schultz 
contends that the district court erred by rejecting his Brady claim. (Id.) However, 
Schultz' challenge fails because the state had no duty to disclose the potentially 
impeaching lab misconduct evidence prior to Schultz' guilty plea. In the 
alternative, Schultz has failed to show that he was prejudiced by any such lack of 
disclosure. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted. 
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The 
court freely reviews the district court's application of the law. kl at 434, 835 P.2d 
at 669. 
C. Schultz Failed To Establish a Bradv Violation 
Idaho Code§ 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
5 
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of 
material fact" as to each element of the petitioner's claims. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing l.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. 
While a court must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the 
court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 
797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). The trial court is not required to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition when the alleged facts, even if 
true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief. kl (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 
865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the application 
are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the 
record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." 
kl 
Due process requires the prosecution to disclose to the defense all 
exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession. Brady v. 
Maryland, 837 U.S. 83 (1963). When there has been a conviction after trial, a 
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Brady violation is found if the defendant can show: (1) that the evidence was 
exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed by the state; 
and (3) materiality (i.e. prejudice). State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 380, 247 
P.3d 582, 607 (2010) (citing Stricklerv. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)). 
However, "the United States Constitution does not require the State to 
disclose material impeachment information prior to entering a plea agreement 
with the defendant." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 64, 105 P.3d 376, 390 
(2004) (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 
(2002)). This is because impeachment evidence "is special in relation to the 
fairness of a trial not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary." Dunlap, 141 
Idaho at 64, 106 P.3d at 390 (emphasis in original) (quoting Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 
629); see also United States v. Mathur. 624 F.3d 498, 507 (1st Cir. 2010) ("Ruiz 
teaches that Brady does not protect against the possible prejudice that may 
ensue from the loss of an opportunity to plea-bargain with complete knowledge of 
all relevant facts. This makes good sense: when a defendant chooses to admit 
his guilt, Brady concerns subside."). 
Further, on a Brady challenge to a guilty plea, the test of prejudice is 
whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the state's failure to 
produce the information, the defendant would not have entered the plea but 
would have insisted upon going to trial. Roeder v. State, 144 Idaho 415, 418, 
162 P.3d 794, 797 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 436, 
885 P.2d 1144, 1152 (Ct. App. 1994). In making this determination, the court will 
"employ an objective assessment, based in part on the persuasiveness of the 
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withheld information as to whether the particular defendant and his counsel 
would have insisted on going to trial." Roeder, 144 Idaho at 418-419, 162 P.3d 
at 797-798. The court will not consider a defendant's subjective statements that 
he would not have pied guilty had he known of the information. 1!h at 419, 162 
P .3d at 798. The court must also consider any objective motivations a defendant 
may have had for pleading guilty. Gardner, 126 Idaho at 436-437, 885 P.2d at 
1152-1153. "Any benefit derived by the defendant from the guilty plea is a 
significant factor inasmuch as a plea may be heavily motivated by reduction of 
exposure to additional charges and criminal penalties." 1!h at 437, 885 P.2d at 
1153 
In this case, the district court correctly concluded that the state was not 
required to disclose evidence of lab misconduct prior to Schultz' guilty plea, 
because such evidence was merely potentially impeaching, and not exculpatory. 
(R., pp.197-199.) In addition, Schultz has failed to show prejudice, in that he has 
failed to show that but for the state's failure to produce the information, a 
reasonable defendant in his position would have insisted on going to trial. 
Schultz has therefore failed to show that the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
1. Evidence Regarding Idaho State Police Lab Misconduct Was 
Merely Impeaching 
Impeachment evidence is that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e. 
to reduce the effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth evidence which 
explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony. State v. Marsh, 
8 
141 Idaho 862, 868-869, 119 P.3d 637, 643-644 (Ct. App. 2004). Exculpatory 
evidence relates to a defendant's guilt or innocence. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 
772, 781, 984 P.2d 127, 136 (1997). As discussed above, a state has no duty to 
disclose evidence which is merely impeaching, and not exculpatory, prior to a 
defendant's guilty plea. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629. 
Anderson's unauthorized maintenance of a box of controlled substances 
at the Idaho State Police Laboratory for display purposes did not constitute 
exculpatory evidence because it did not relate to Schultz' guilt or factual 
innocence. There is no indication from the record that the unauthorized conduct 
involved any forensic testing, or had any effect on the accuracy and reliability of 
any forensic testing actually conducted. 
At most, the evidence related only to Anderson's credibility, and thus 
constituted potential impeachment testimony. Schultz appeared to acknowledge 
as much in his amended post-conviction petition, in which he alleged he was 
"prohibited from engaging in appropriate cross-examination of Skyler Anderson 
concerning the above-described violations of laboratory policies and procedures 
in order to impeach him with regards to his credibility and propensity for 
truthfulness, all in violation of Petitioner's Sixth Amendment Constitutional Right 
to confront all [the] witnesses against him." (R., p.96; see also R., pp.148-156 
(Schultz' "Amended Memorandum in Opposition to State's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal," in which Schultz describes the potentially impeaching nature of the 
lab misconduct evidence)). At a hearing on the state's motion for summary 
dismissal, Schultz conceded that the Idaho State Police's investigation did not 
9 
concern Anderson's qualifications or the quality of his testing, but instead 
implicated his right to impeach Anderson. (Tr., p.22, L.13 - p.26, L.13.) 
It was only after the district court summarily dismissed Schultz' petition 
that Schultz then claimed, in his motion for reconsideration, that the lab 
misconduct evidence was both impeaching and exculpatory. (R., pp.210-212.) 
Specifically, Schultz contends that the evidence was exculpatory because 
Anderson's reliability is "determinative of guilt or innocence." (Appellant's brief, 
pp.16-17.) This contention is unpersuasive. Any lack of "reliability" or credibility 
that can be inferred from Anderson's unauthorized maintenance of controlled 
substances for display purposes is not at all "determinative" of the accuracy, or 
lack thereof, of forensic testing completed on completely separate substances. 
Schultz' attack is on Anderson's credibility, not on the accuracy of the testing 
conducted in this case. 
In addition, Schultz appears to contend that the evidence of lab 
misconduct casts doubt on the entire proper functioning of the lab and the testing 
it conducts. (Appellant's brief, p.18.) Specifically, Schultz asserts that the 
misconduct "clearly demonstrates that there were no set procedures concerning 
the amount of substance which was to be taken from each substance for testing 
purposes, there were no rules or regulations concerning the destruction of 
samples, nor were the forensic analysts being audited concerning their policies 
and procedures relating to the analysis of controlled substances," and that it is 
"entirely possible that the entire forensic laboratory was contaminated by the 
unaccounted for controlled substances." (Appellant's brief, p.18.) 
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There is no support in the record for these contentions. The very nature of 
the misconduct was that Anderson's maintenance of the controlled substances 
occurred outside the rules, regulations, and regular procedures of the state lab. 
These substances maintained for display purposes were, in fact, "not tracked" 
and "untraceable." Thus, the existence of these controlled substances did not 
demonstrate the lack of existing procedures and regulations, but constituted a 
violation of those existing regulations concerning the maintenance and tracking 
of these specific drugs that were maintained improperly. These violations 
occurred entirely outside normal functions of the state lab, including its forensic 
testing function, and there is no indication that they implicated results of the 
testing associated with Schultz' criminal case. 
As in Ruiz, Schultz' guilty plea precludes a Brady challenge based on 
impeachment evidence. Because evidence that Idaho State Police forensic 
scientists maintained an unauthorized box of controlled substances for display 
purposes was not exculpatory, but was merely impeaching, the state did not 
have a duty to disclose it prior to Schultz' guilty plea. Schultz has therefore failed 
to show that state the state committed a Brady violation, or that the district court 
erred in summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition. 
2. In The Alternative, Schultz Has Failed To Show Prejudice 
Even if the state had the duty to disclose the evidence of lab misconduct 
prior to Schultz' guilty plea, Schultz has still failed to establish a Brady violation 
because he has failed to establish prejudice. Specifically, he has failed to show 
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that but for the state's failure to produce the information, that a reasonable 
defendant in his position would have insisted on going to trial. 
For many of the same reasons the evidence is not exculpatory, it was also 
of little value to Schultz' defense at any trial. Schultz has identified no nexus 
between Anderson's misconduct and the testing results that incriminated him in 
his criminal case. The existence of the lab misconduct did not refute the 
accuracy of the results of the forensic testing that incriminated Schultz, nor did it 
reduce or negate Schultz' culpability in any way. In addition, while not dispositive 
to the objective analysis of prejudice, Schultz submitted no sworn statements 
during the post-conviction proceedings indicating why he pied guilty to the 
methamphetamine possession charge, or even whether he would have gone to 
trial if the lab misconduct evidence had been available to him. 
It appears from the record that Schultz received a plea bargain benefit 
from entering his guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. While there is 
no direct evidence in the record regarding the nature of any plea bargain, Schultz 
was also charged in Case No. CR-2006-2718 with possession of drug 
paraphernalia. (See Idaho Data Repository, Minidoka County, Case No. CR 
2006-02718.) That charge was dismissed shortly after Schultz was sentenced to 
possession of methamphetamine in the same case. (Id.) Schultz also received 
the benefit of a concurrent sentence. The district court ran Schultz' possession 
of methamphetamine sentence concurrently with a sentence imposed upon a 
revoked probation in another case. (R., p.122; see also Idaho Data Repository, 
Minidoka County, Case No. CR 2005-01139.) 
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Even if the district court erred in concluding that the state had no duty to 
disclose the lab misconduct prior to Schultz' guilty plea, Schultz has still failed to 
show that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his post-conviction 
petition, because he has failed to show prejudice from any lack of disclosure. 
11. 
Schultz Has Failed To Show That The District Court Manifestly Abused its 
Discretion In Denying His Motion For Reconsideration 
Fourteen days after the district court summarily dismissed his petition for 
post-conviction relief, Schultz filed a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to 
l.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B). (R., pp.205-213.) Because l.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B) pertains 
only to motions for reconsideration made from interlocutory orders of the trial 
court, the district court construed the motion as a timely l.R.C.P. 59(e) motion to 
alter or amend a civil judgment. (R., pp.217-224 (citing Ross v. State, 141 Idaho 
670, 671, 115 P .3d 761, 762 (Ct. App. 2005)). 
Pursuant to l.R.C.P. 59(e), a district court may correct legal and factual 
errors occurring in the proceedings before it. Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 71, 
175 P.3d 754, 760 (2007). A decision to grant or deny an l.R.C.P. 59(e) motion 
for reconsideration generally rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. (Id.) 
An order denying a motion made under l.R.C.P. 59(e) to alter or amend a 
judgment is appealable, but only on the question of whether there has been a 
manifest abuse of discretion. Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 263, 646 P.2d 1030, 
1034 (1982). 
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In his l.R.C.P. 59(e) motion, Schultz asked the district court to reconsider 
its determination that Schultz failed to establish a prima facie claim of a Brady 
violation. (R., pp.205-212.) Schultz also requested, for the first time, 3 for the 
court to grant him a new trial on the basis of the "newly discovered evidence" of 
the lab misconduct. (R., p.212.) 
The district court considered the merits of Schultz' arguments regarding 
the alleged Brady violation, but found that Schultz failed to show either that 
evidence of the lab misconduct was exculpatory rather than impeaching, or that 
Schultz established prejudice. (R., pp.217-221.) The court then recognized that 
that it lacked the authority to consider Schultz' new evidence claim raised for the 
first time in his l.R.C.P. 59(e) motion.4 (R., pp.222-223.) 
For the reasons discussed in Section I, above, Schultz has failed to show 
that the district court erred in denying his motion to reconsider its rejection of his 
Brady claim. On appeal, Schultz does not challenge the district court's rejection 
of his request for a new trial, but in any event, the district court correctly 
concluded that a defendant cannot raise new claims in an l.R.C.P. 59(e) motion. 
See Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 707, 979 P.2d 107, 109 (1999) 
("As a means to circumvent an appeal, Rule 59(e) provides a trial court a 
3 Schultz' initial pro se petition for post-conviction relief referenced a "new 
evidence" claim. (R., p.2) However, his amended petition abandoned this claim 
and instead alleged a Brady violation. (R., pp.94-98.) 
4 The district court also determined that even if it had such authority, Schultz 
failed to present new material evidence that would probably produce an acquittal. 
(R., pp.222-223 (citing State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976)). 
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mechanism to correct legal and factual errors occurring in proceedings before 
it."). Therefore, Schultz has failed to show that the district court manifestly 
abused its discretion by denying his motion for reconsideration. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
summarily dismissing Schultz' petition for post-conviction relief, and its order 
denying his motion for reconsideration. 
DATED this 17th day of June, 2013. 
' MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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